General evaluation
Lucid and sweeping analysis of American hegemony and how to use it. Central thesis of the book can be summarized as follows:
The US is the first and last truly global superpower. It has about 20 years to shape the post-hegemonial world. The key area in the world is Eurasia, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. In that vast area, there are about five active geostrategic players and five geopolitical pivots. The key to a peaceful and prosperous world lies in the proper management of the pivots and in the fashioning of constructive relations with the big players. The US should aim for an equal partnership with a unified Europe and close cooperation with a confident greater China as well as with a regionally stabilizing and democratic India. A modernized post-imperial Russia should be drawn towards Europe, while Japan, though not a dominant regional force, can act alongside the US as a global civil actor. In the longer term, one could imagine a Trans-Eurasian Security System.
The style is refreshingly clear and forthright, the analysis compelling. Concerning Europe, Brzezinski’s line is entirely logical and coherent. Both The U.S. and Europe share a common interest in developing a more equal strategic partnership, including within NATO. The Americans must relinquish the ambiguity which sometimes characterizes their attitude towards European unification, but the real challenge is for the Europeans themselves to get their act together. The future of Europe hinges on the Franco-German relationship. Brzezinski is very dismissive about the role of the UK, rightly so when one looks at the history of UK-EU relations, maybe slightly less so if Blair manages to lead the UK into the EMU and to build upon the promising initiatives taken in the area of an ESDP. (NB: the book was finished in 1997)
Summary of the book
The first two chapters set the scene. Chapter one describes ‘The hegemony of a new type’ exerted by the USA, characterized by the rapidity of its emergence (barely one century), its global scope, and the manner of its exercise (co-optation, indirect influence, use of alliances and IFIs, global military reach, technological edge, cultural mass dominance).
Chapter two describes ‘The Eurasian chessboard’, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok; this is the area where world dominance is decided. On this chessboard, there are five active geostrategic players[1] (F, D, Russia, China and India) and five geopolitical pivots[2] (Turkey, Iran, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and South Korea). Turkey and Iran also have some potential to be players in their region. The UK does not qualify as a major player, mainly because its refusal to really engage in Europe makes it politically fairly irrelevant, even though it retains a role as America’s key supporter, a very loyal ally, a vital military base.[3] Its friendship must be nourished, but its policies do not call for sustained attention. As to Japan, likewise, it remains a major country and an important American (civil)ally on the world scene, but the real far eastern power is China.
The next four chapters zoom in on the major zones of the Eurasian chessboard. ‘The democratic bridgehead’ deals with Western and Central Europe and centres on the expanding EU. The EU is America’s natural ally, because of shared values, a common religious background, democracy, market economy). It clearly has the potential to become a global power. For that to happen, though, the Europeans will have to get their act together and manage both enlargement and deepening. There is a risk of Europe losing its momentum; it sometimes ‘conveys the impression of a troubled, unfocused, comfortable yet socially uneasy set of societies, not partaking of any larger vision. European unification is increasingly a process and not a cause.’(P.60) Franco-German cooperation is crucial for the future of European integration and should be encouraged. American engagement in the cause of European unification is needed to compensate for the internal crisis of morale and purpose that might sap European vitality. This also means that America must abandon its sometimes ambiguous attitude and accept a more assertive Europe. In the medium term, the transatlantic relationship should develop into an equal partnership, including within NATO. Brzezinski concludes as follows: “Hence, America’s central geostrategic goal in Europe can be summed up quite simply: it is to consolidate through a more genuine transatlantic partnership the U.S. bridgehead on the Eurasian continent so that an enlarging Europe can become a more viable springboard for projecting into Eurasia the international democratic and cooperative order.”(p.86)
The next chapter (‘The black hole’) centres on Russia. With the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s frontiers have been rolled backed to where they had been in the Caucasus in the early 1800s, in Central Asia in the mid-1880s, and, more dramatically still, in the West around approximately 1600. The geopolitical shift is enormous, and the adjustment painful. What are the options for Russia? Brzezinski looks at three possible options and comes to the conclusion that none of them presents a viable alternative. The idea of a mature partnership or even condominium with America is illusory because of the huge discrepancy between the two entities. An approach based on the “near abroad” and the objective of some restoration of imperial control over the former Soviet territories- sometimes hidden behind the term of ‘eurasianism’- founders on the fact that Russia is not strong enough politically to impose its will and not attractive enough economically to be able to seduce the new states. Lastly, the idea of a counter alliance, involving some sort of Eurasian anti-U.S. coalition between Russia, China and Iran, is doomed to fail because Russia has too little to offer and would anyway be the junior partner of a greater China. The members of such a hypothetical alliance would risk being thrown into isolation and a shared backwardness. In fact, Russia only really has one geostrategic option, and that is Europe. “No other option can offer Russia the benefits that a modern, rich, and democratic Europe linked to America can.” For that to work, Russia will have to clearly abandon its imperial past and accept the enlarging Europe’s political and security links with America. It will also have to accept that no democratic state of Europe can be excluded from the transatlantic community by a Russian veto.
In the following chapter, Brzezinski examines what he calls ‘The Eurasian Balkans’. By this he means the five Central Asian CIS countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), the three Caucasian republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia), and finally Afghanistan. To some extent, Turkey and Iran could be added to this list. The whole region is a power vacuum and is internally unstable. The countries concerned “suffer from serious internal difficulties, all of them have frontiers that are either the object of claims by neighbours or are zones of ethnic resentment, few are nationally homogeneous, and some are already embroiled in territorial, ethnic , or religious violence.” There is a strong competition involving directly three neighbouring powers, i.e. Russia, Turkey and Iran, with China a fourth potential protagonist. Also concerned, but more remotely, are the Ukraine, Pakistan and India. One of the central questions is related to the access to energy and the issue of pipelines. Russian efforts to monopolize access need to be opposed, but at the same time the exclusion of Russia from the area is neither desirable nor feasible. In this region, America shares a common interest not only with a stable and pro-Western turkey, but also with Iran and China.
In ‘The Far Eastern Anchor’, Brzezinski analyses the triangular relationship between the USA, China and Japan. For him, “a close relationship with maritime Japan is essential for America’s global policy, but a cooperative relationship with mainland China is imperative for America’s Eurasian geostrategy.” East Asia is a very dynamic region, but also one with a high potential for crises. A lot will depend on the evolution of China. This country is definitely bound to become the dominant state in the region, but Brzezinski does not share the view of those who see China emerge as a world power of the first rank in the foreseeable future. It is not at all certain that this country can maintain its explosive growth rates. Even if it does, China will still in 20 years time be a relatively poor country. Moreover, the high growth rates produce side-effects in terms of inequalities and a worsening energy and environment situation. Finally, the future of Chinese politics is a big question-mark. For all these reasons, it would be a big mistake to organize a coalition, notably with Japan, to contain China’s rise to global power. That would only ensure that a regional dominant China would be hostile. It would be far better to try to draw China into wider international cooperation and to treat it as a globally significant player. Concerning Taiwan, America should make it clear that the use of force will be met with a US response, but that a reunification by peaceful and democratic means would not be opposed by the U.S. Concerning Japan, Brzezinski advocates the opposite approach; unlike China, which can seek global power by first becoming a regional power, Japan can gain global influence by eschewing the quest for regional power. He sees a role for Japan similar to the one which Canada plays at a more moderate level.
In his final chapter, Brzezinski draws the conclusions from his analysis. The following quotation sums it up rather neatly:
“In the short run, it is in America’s interest to consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism on the map of Eurasia. That puts a premium on manoeuvre and manipulation in order to prevent the emergence of a hostile coalition that could eventually seek to challenge America’s primacy, not to mention the remote possibility of any one particular state seeking to do so. By the middle tem, the foregoing should gradually yield to a greater emphasis on the emergence of increasingly important but strategically compatible partners who, prompted by American leadership, might help to shape a more cooperative trans-Eurasian security system. Eventually, in the much longer run still, the foregoing could phase into a global core of genuinely shared political responsibility.”(P.198)
[1] Active geostrategic players are the states that have the capacity and the national will to exercise power or influence beyond their borders in order to alter-to a degree that affects America’s interests-the existing geopolitical state of affairs.
[2] Geopolitical pivots are the states whose importance is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behaviour of geostrategic players.
[3] Quote, p.42 : ‘In contrast, Great Britain is not a geostrategic player. It has fewer major options, it entertains no ambitious vision of Europe’s future, and its relative decline has also reduced its capacity to play the traditional role of the European balancer. Its ambivalence regarding European unification and its attachment to a waning special relationship with America have made Great Britain increasingly irrelevant insofar as the major choices confronting Europe’s future are concerned. London has largely dealt itself out of the European game.’
